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RIDING ON

FOR WRONGFUL

FREE PASS-APPLICABILITY

DEATH

OF RAILROAD EMPLOYEE

OF FEDERAL OR STATE LAW

Francis v. Southern Pac. Co.1

Jack R. Francis, an employee of the Southern Pacific Company, was killed
while riding in interstate commerce on a pass issued to him without charge by
virtue of his employment with the company. The accident occurred in Utah. The

pass stipulated that the user assumed all risk of injury to person or property by
negligence or otherwise and absolved the issuing company from liability therefor.
The minor children of Francis brought suit in the federal district court for damages
for his death. The issue of wanton negligence was submitted to the jury, but
the trial court refused to submit the issue of ordinary negligence. A verdict for the
defendant was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals and by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Under Utah law, the heirs of the decedent have an action for his wrongful
death.2 This action is distinct from any action the decedent might have had if he
had lived, 3 but defenses available against the decedent are available against the
heirs.4 In Utah, a carrier is liable for injuries caused by ordinary negligence, even
though such person is riding on a free pass which by its terms exempts the carrier
from such liability.5
In 1898, in Clicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Solan,6 the United States Supreme
Court held that state law was applicable to determine the liability of a carrier
for injury to a passenger, in this case a drover,7 carried to interstate commerce.
Subsequently, in Northern Pac. .Ry. v. Adams," it was held that under federal law
a carrier could successfully exempt itself from liability for negligence by so stipulating
1. 68 Sup. Ct. 611 (1948), affirming 162 F. 2d 813 (C.C.A. 10th 1947).
2.

UTAH CODE,

1943, 104-3-11.

3. Mason v. Union Pacific R.R., 7 Utah 77, 24 Pac. 796 (1890).
4. Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. Ry., 186 P. 2d 293 (Utah 1947) (The right
of the heirs is "to proceed against the wrongdoer subject to the defenses available
against the deceased, had he lived and prosecuted the suit.") Opinion on rehearing,
189 P. 2d 701 (1948).
5. Williams v. Oregon Short-Line Ry., 18 Utah 210, 54 Pac. 991 (1898). Most
states hold that a carrier can relieve itself of liability in this manner. See cases
in 9 A.L.R. 501 (1920).
6. 169 U.S. 133 (1898), affirming 95 Iowa 260, 63 N.W. 692, 28 L.R.A. 718,

58 Am. St. Rep. 430 (1895).

7. A drover, traveling on a pass with a shipment of cattle, is a passenger for
hire. New York Cent. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U.S. 1873).
8. 192 U.S. 440 (1904). See also Boering v. Chesapeake Beach Ry., 193

U.S. 442 (1904)
notice of it.)

(stipulation in free pass binding though passenger had no
(191)
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in a free pass. Following the passage of the Hepburn Act, it was held in 1914'
that, under the Hepburn Act, a carrier could contract away its liability for
negligence by providing therefor in a free pass, and that a pass issued to an employee without charge was actually a gratuity.10 The previous year, however, in
Southern Pac. Co. v. Schuyler'1 it was stated that the Hepburn Act does not
deprive one who accepts gratuitions transportation of the protection of the laws of
the state, even though the free transportation is given in violation of the Hepburn
Act. In 1923, in Kansas City So. Ry. v. Van Zant,12 federal law was held applicable
in the situation of the instant case, when the supreme court ruled that limitations
and conditions of use, as well as permission to issue free passes, are determined by
the Hepburn Act, not by state law, saying:
"The pass proceeded from the federal act; it is controlled necessarily
in its incidents and consequences by the federal act to the exclusion of
state laws and state policies...,,3
This decision has been followed and federal law applied, albeit reluctantly, by at
least one state court.14 However, in passing on the question of a carrier's
liability to a drover traveling on a drover's pass, the opposite view has been taken,
both by the state courts and by the federal district court, and state law has been
applied.15 Missouri has expressed the view that, since neither the Interstate
Commerce Commission nor Congress had dealt with the question of liability on a
drover's pass, it was governed by the common law of the state.1 6
In the instant case, certiorari was granted in order to re-examine the question
of whether state or federal law should be applied, in the light of the decision in
Eiie R.R. v. Tompkin. 17 By a 5-3 decision, federal law was held applicable. The
9. June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 STAT. 584, 49 U.S.C. § 1 ff., 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 ff.
§ 1 (7) permits the issuance of free passes to employees and their families.
10. Charleston & W.C. Ry. v. Thompson, 234 U.S. 576 (1914).
11. 227 U.S. 601 (1913) (Plaintiff, a railway mail employee, accepted and
used a free pass in violation of the Hepburn Act. The court said the liability of
the carrier rose out of local law, not out of the Hepburn Act).
12. 260 U.S. 459 (1923).
13. 260 U. S. 459, 469. On the same basis, it might be argued that prohibition of the issuance of passes to others is a regulation of the issuance of tickets,
and therefore ticketholders are subject to federal, rather than local law.
14. Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 2d 863, 118 P. 2d 465 (1941).
15. Clark v. Southern Ry., 69 Ind. App. 697, 119 N.E. 539 (1918). See
also Dierickx v. Davis, 80 Ind. App. 71, 137 N.E. 685 (1922) cert. denied 263 U.S.
709 (1923). See also Wiley v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 227 Fed. 127 (1915)
(state law held applicable to man traveling on drover's pass).
16. Edmondson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 264 S.W. 470 (Mo. App. 1924),
later appeal in 220 Mo. App. 294, 286 S.W. 439 (1926) and 8 S.W. 2d 103 (Mo.
App. 1928).
Missouri has taken the view that any negligence of a carrier toward a passenger
traveling on a free pass is gross negligence. Bryan v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 32 Mo.
App. 228 (1888).
17, 304 U.S. 64, 114 A.L.R. 1487, 1500 (1938) ("Except in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter
of federal concern. There is no federal general common law.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/4
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majority opinion relies on the decisions in the Adams, Thompson, and Van Zant
cases, with no mention of either the Solan or the Schuyler cases, and concludes
that, because 'the Transportation Act of 194018 made no changes in the free pass
provisions of the Hepburn Act, other than to broaden them, the old interpretation
had become part of the "warp and woof" of the Hepburn Act, and that there is
therefore no room for application of the Erie doctrine.
The dissenting opinion, written by Mr. Justice Black, strongly attacks the
majority view. In the eyes of the minority, Utah law should govern this case,
since Congress has never entrenched upon the power of all the states to provide
damages for wrongful death. The decision is attacked as being a return to the
"general commercial law" doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.19 Even if federal law
governs, the minority considers the decision wrong, thinking it is out of line with
current social trends in that it denies the financal protection of damages for wrongful death to a class of people who need it badly.
The Court's "re-examination" of the question here involved does
entirely satisfactory. It is recognized that Utah law governs the persons
bring an action, and, seemingly, that Utah law governs the defenses
against those persons. Yet a defense which Utah law would not allow is

not seem
who may
available
permitted

to bar the plaintiffs' claim. This defense is allowed because of a decision-Northern
Pa. Ry. v. Adams 20-made under the now repudiated doctrine of "general commercial law;" a decision which was later said to be applicable under the Hepburn Act, but still at a time when the Swift v. Tyson doctrine was controlling.
The Court makes no mention of cases which seemingly point in the opposite
direction, nor of state decisions which apply state law to protect passengers riding
on passes. This omission leaves some doubt as to the validity of the claim that the
Court's interpretation has become part of the "warp and woof" of the Hepburn
Act. It is submitted that, as claimed by the dissenting justices, this is an encroachment on the Erie doctrine. It is true that the federal government has complete control over interstate commerce. It is just as true, up until this time, the states
have been considered to have control over actions for wrongful death. Congress
has passed no federal wrongful death act. But, by this decision, the control of
the states over wrongful death actions is partially denied, when, as stated by the
California Supreme Court, there is nothing in the Hepburn Act conflicting with
state rules on liability for negligence, and the Hepburn Act sets forth no objective
that would be hindered by the application of state law. 2 ' The fact that one man
is permitted by federal statute to ride "free," while another is not, seems a flimsy

18. Act September 18, 1940, 54 STAT. 898, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1.
19. 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
20. Supra, note 8.
21. Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, note 14.
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excuse for denying to the former the protection which state law gives the
latter22 And it would seem that, as the dissenting justices argued:
"... the very absence of a federal statute to take the place of local
wrongful death statutes should be the equivalent of a loud congressional
' 23
warning to courts to refrain from encroaching on state powers here."
JosEPH

CONSTrTUTIONAL

LAw-DUE

PROCESS--ORDINANCE

PROHIBITING

J.

RUsSELL

OPERATION

ON

Crry STREETS OF SOuND TRUCKS EMrNG LouD AND RAUCOUS NosEs

DoEs

NOT VIoLATE FlREsoM OF SPEECH

Kovacs v. Coopeia
Kovacs operated his sound truck on the streets of Trenton, New Jersey,
and was convicted for violating a city ordinance which provided:
"4. That it shall be unlawful for any person . . . to play ...upon the
public streets ... any device known as a sound truck ... or any instrument
of any kind which emits therefrom loud and raucous noises and is attached
to and upon any vehicle...."2
On appeal, Kovacs challenged the ordinance on the grounds that it was
"so obscure, vague, and indefinite" as to violate the due pseocess clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that it invaded his rights of free speech. His conviction was affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court,2 the New Jersey Court
of Errors and Appeals, 4 and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Division in the Supreme Court of the United States was five to four, with
such a diversity of opinions being written that no one justice could properly be
said to have spoken for the Court. Mr. Justice Reed delivered an opinion in which
22. The statement has been made that, in the case of drovers' passes, the
pass is not actually a gratuity, for the railroad received a benefit. See New York
Cent. Ry. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 (U.S. 1873), and, also, Grand Trunk Ry. of
Canada v. Stevens, 95 U.S. 655 (1877). If this is the test of whether a pass is a
gratuity, it would appear that an employee's pass is not a gratuity, despite the
statement made by the court in Charleston & W. C. Ry. v. Thompson, supra, note 10,
that it is. The following statement, made during the debate of the Hepburn
Act in the Senate, indicates that at least some senators did not consider an employee's pass a gratuity: "The matter of free transportation . . . enters
partly into the consideration for their employment, and we have no moral
right to deprive them of that privilege." 40 CONG. REc. 7981. See also, Sassaman
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 144 F. 2d 950 (C.C.A. 3d 1944).
23. Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 68 Sup., Ct. 611, 621 (1948) (dissenting
opinion).
1. 69 Sup. Ct. 448 (1949).
2. Ordinance No. 430, pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. Tit. 40: 48-1 (8),
authorizing the city "to prevent disturbing noises."
3. 135 N.J.L. 64, 50 A. 2d 451 (1946).
4. 135 N.J.L. 584, 52 A. 2d 806 (1947).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/4
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the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Burton joined. Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson wrote separate concurring opinions. Mr. Justice Black presented a dissenting opinion on behalf of himself and Justices Douglas and Rutledge. The
latter also gave a separate opinion, and Mr. Justice Murphy dissented without
opinion.
On the issue of whether or not the language of the ordinance was sufficiently
clear and definite to be interpreted with reasonable accuracy, the objection was
based on the words "loud and raucous." Only Mr. Justice Reed commented on
this argument. He thought that this contention "merits only a passing reference."
That reference was to "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting,"
which had been suggested as sufficiently clear because well understood as a result
of long use in criminal law, while "massing stories to incite crime" was held to
be unconstitutionally vague. 6 "Loud and raucous" were thought to be more
like the former than the latter, Mr. Justice Reed merely saying, "We think the
words of § 4 of this Trenton ordinance comply with the requirements of definiteness and clarity, set out above."1 Evidently no member of the Court thought
the words quoted furnished a basis for any valid objection.
The requirement of clarity and definiteness presents another problem, however, but one which, unfortunately, only Mr. Justice Rutledge discussed. He
emphasized the fact that the members of the Court were not agreed on the interpretation which should be given the ordinance. Mr. Justice Reed and those for
whom he spoke understood the New Jersey courts to have construed the ordinance as prohibiting only sound trucks and similar machines on the streets
emitting loud and raucous noises. Justices Jackson, Black, Douglas, and Rutledge
thought it clear that the New Jersey courts had read the ordinance as an absolute prohibition of all use of sound trucks within the city of Trenton. Justices Frankfurter and Murphy said nothing of the meaning of the enactment. In the face
of these differing constructions, Mr. Justice Rutledge was of the opinion that
the ordinance was clearly violative of due process regardless of any questions of
freedom of speech. He commented, "No man should be subject to punishment

5. The requirement was stated as follows in Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95
(1948): "Legislation may run afoul of the Due Process Clause because it fails
to give adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding, to advise defendants
of the nature of the offense with which they are charged, or to guide courts in
trying those who are accused." See annotations in 70 L. Ed. 322 and 83 L. Ed. 893.
6. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). "No person shall address
any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any other person . .

."

was held

sufficiently clear in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In
United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947), a statute making it an offense
to compel a broadcaster to employ more than the "number of employees needed,"
was held sufficiently definite, the court making the interesting comment, "Clearer
and more precise language might have been framed by Congress. . . . But
" 332 U.S.
none occurs to us, nor has any better language been suggested ...

at p. 7.
7. 69 Sup. Ct. at 450.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
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under a statute when even a bare majority of judges upholding the conviction
cannot agree upon what acts the statute denounces." 8
Another and related difficulty is discussed in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Black. He argued that the ordinance was an absolute prohibition, that the
charge filed against Kovacs made no reference to "loud and raucous noises," that
the record contained no evidence tending to show that Kovacs' machine made
loud and raucous noises, and that, therefore, the New Jersey courts convicted
Kovacs simply for operating a sound truck on the streets of Trenton. But
three of the majority in the Supreme Court understood the ordinance to prohibit
only machines making loud and raucous noises, and approved the conviction on
the theory that the ordinance was valid because not an absolute prohibition.
Is it possible that an ordinance which generates all this confusion is still so clear
and definite that it can be reasonably interpreted?o Commented Mr. Justice
Black, "Affirmance here means that the appellant will be punished for an offense
with which he was not charged, to prove which no evidence was offered, and of
which he was not convicted, according to the only New Jersey court which
affirmed with opinion."' 0 How, in the midst of all this disagreement on its meaning, the ordinance could be upheld and Kovacs convicted is difficult to understand.
At least one important source of confusion is to be found in the opinions of
the New Jersey courts. It is simply impossible to determine by a study of those
opinions what the ordinance was construed to mean. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey presented only one opinion. Near the beginning of that opinion,
the court said, "The relevant provisions of the ordinance apply only to (1)
vehicles (2) containing an instrument in the nature of a sound amplifier or any
other instrument emitting loud and raucous noises. . . ."'I But near the end
of the same opinion the court said, "In simple, unambiguous language it prohibits
the use upon the public streets of any device known as a sound truck, loud
speaker or sound amplifier."1 2 In the Court of Errors and Appeals, which affirmed by an equally divided court, there was no opinion for affirmation. One of
to
the opinions for reversal argued that the ordinance was an attempt, "...

8. 69 Sup. Ct. at 462.
9. Compare the action of the Court in Musser v. Utah, supra, note 5. Sec.
103-11-1, UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) condemned conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public morals, including conspiracy to counsel, advise, and practice
polygamy. When argument before the Supreme Court raised the question of
whether or not the statute was too vague and indefinite, conviction was vacated
and the case remitted to the Utah court for construction of the statute.
10. 69 Sup. Ct. at 460. Cf. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948), in
which both the defendant and the trial court construed the information as
charging an offense under Sec. 2 of the relevant act. The Arkansas Supreme
Court affirmed on the theory that the defendant had violated Sec. 1. Reversed
without dissent, for deprivation of due process.
11. 50 A. 2d at 452.
12. Id. at 453.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/4
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prohibit ... under all circumstances . . . the use of sound amplifying systems." 13
The other said among other things, "The prohibition is against the emitting of
'loud and raucous' noises ... ."'I As has been observed, both of these interpretations gained some currency in the Supreme Court of the United States. The
only other apparent possibility appears to be that the ordinance defined sound
trucks as necessarily emitting loud and raucous noises, and the Supreme Court
was aware of that possibility too, as Mr. Justice Reed indicated in a footnote.
Under these circumstances, it would appear that the case might very well
have been returned to the New Jersey courts so that they could clarify their
construction of the ordinance. Unless the Supreme Court was willing to invalidate the ordinance or set aside the conviction for lack of due process, a return
for construction of the ordinance would seem the only proper course, especially
since the Court considers itself bound by the state court's interpretation of a
state enactment.' 5 That the suggested procedure is permissible seems clear.
The court on occasion has remitted a cause to the state court for "reconsideration
and amplification of the record."6 It has also remitted a cause to the state court
7
for construction of a statute questioned for lack of clarity.
The Supreme Court also held that the ordinance did not unduly invade
Kovacs' freedom of speech. On this point there was a clear thread of agreement
among members of the court, at least in principle. The entire Court, with the
exception of Mr. Justice Murphy, who dissented without opinion, expressly
recognized that the problem was one of reconciling conflicting interests, one of
achieving "wise accommodation between liberty and order. .. "18 The rights of
13. 52 A. 2d at 809.
14. Ibid.
15. 69 Sup. Ct. at 452. Note the statement of the Court in Winters v.
New York, 68 Sup. Ct. at 669 (1948), "This construction fixes the meaning of
the statute for this case. The interpretation by the Court of Appeals puts these
words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legislature."
Query: if the state court offers two constructions, is the Supreme Court free
to accept that which preserves the validity of the statute? In construing Federal
Statutes, the Court seeks to avoid invalidating them. "The obligation rests also
upon this Court in construing congressional enactments to take care to interpret
them so as to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality." United States v. Congress of
Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106 (1948), holding that Sec. 313, Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended in 1947, 2 U.S.C.A. § 251, "It is unlawful
for . . . any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election. . ." did not apply to a regular union periodical published
to further the aims of the union, though that periodical expressed views on
political proposals and candidates.
16. Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948). The following
statement from the opinion in that case might not be inapplicable to the one
under discussion. "While we might be able, on the present record, to reach a
conclusion that would decide the case, it might well be found later to be lacking
in the thoroughness that should precede judgment of this importance . .
17. Musser v. Utah, supra, notes 5 and 6.
18. Mr. Justice Frankfurter at p. 454. Compare the statement of the
majority in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), invalidating an ordinance
prohibiting the use of loudspeakers without a permit obtained from the Chief
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the public to peace and order may be protected, but that protection must not
result in a real interference with the rights of free speech. Accordingly, all
members of the Court who expressed views would appear prepared to sustain
some measure of regulation or control of such devices as sound trucks.19
How much or what kind of regulation might be upheld, however, is a difficult
question. It is complicated by the rather indefinite doctrine of the "preferred
position" of the freedoms of the First Amendment. The opinions of Mr. Justice
Reed and Mr. Justice Rutledge recognized that doctrine without defining it in
any way. Mr. Justice Frankfurter objected to it as an attempt to express
"a complicated process of constitutional adjudication by a deceptive formula."2 °
He purported to trace the evolution of the doctrine and to conclude that a majority of the Court has never accepted the idea that legislation touching the
field of the First Amendment is to be presumed invalid. 21 It may be, as would
appear, that the Court has never expressly stated that such legislation is to be
presumed invalid, but there is no doubt that a majority of the Court has accepted
the doctrine of some sort of "preferred position." Mr. Justice Roberts referred to
it in Schneider v. State of New Jersey,22 speaking for the entire Court with the
exception of Mr. Justice McReynolds. And in Sae v. New York,,2 a majority
of five expressed a belief in the "preferred position." About the only thing clear
about the preferred position is that it is very indefinite. Perhaps it means, as
would seem reasonable, that when legislation concerning the freedoms set out
in the First Amendment comes before the Court there should be no presumption
at all, rather than the usual presumption of validity attached to other types
24
of enactments.
of Police, "Courts must balance the various community interests in passing on
the constitutionality of local regulations of the character involved here. But
in that process they should be mindful to keep the freedoms of the First Amendment in a preferred position."
19. So also in Saia v. New York, supra, note 18, the five-justice majority
which condemned the ordinance expressly suggested that abuses in the use of
amplifiers might be controlled by "narrowly drawn statutes" directed, for example, to the volume of sound, or to the hours and place of operation.
20. 69 Sup. Ct. at 458.
21. The entire opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter is worth reading in
this connection. He purported to find the origin of ideas now applied to freedom
of speech in the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes, who, he said, "was far more
ready to find legislative invasion where free inquiry was involved than in the
debatable area of economics."
22. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
23. 334 U.S. 558 (1948), supra, note 18.
24. It would seem that at least some of the statements on the subject
could be interpreted as suggesting either a presumption of invalidity or no
presumption at all. Note, for example, "They are susceptible of restriction only
to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect." West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 147 A.L.R. 674 (1943). ". . . the delicate and difficult task falls upon the
courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the
reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the
rights." Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), supra, note 22.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/4
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The problem of the degree and type of regulation permissible is also no

doubt further complicated by the long series of adjudications involving other
types of activity and means of communication.

this type proceed upon analogy?

Should decision in cases of

If so, should sound amplifiers be treated as

most like the publication of newspapers and magazines, 25 or the distribution of

pamphlets and circulars,26 or speaking without amplifiers to assemblies on the
streets or other public places,27 or parading in the public streets in expression of
views on labor, politics, or religion? 28 Or is the amplifier more like the billboard, the advertising circular, or the poster on the outside of a truck operated on
the public streets? 29 Perhaps the operation of a loudspeaker might more properly
be compared with the beating of drums and the blowing of slide trombones.30
Mr. Justice Reed seemed to think the use of the amplifier somewhat similar to

addressing gatherings on the streets. Mr. Justice Black appeared to think that
the problem should be approached on the same basis as that of any other

means of disseminating ideas and information, as did Mr. Justice Rutledge. Mr.
Justice Reed, however, was clearly of opinion that the use of loudspeakers was
to be distinguished from the distribution of circulars or leaflets. Whatever
analogy might be thought helpful, it seems clear that the use of amplifying systems
is entitled to and will get some protection under the heading of free speech. Only
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson appeared prepared to sustain an absolute prohibition of all use of such devices in the cities.

25. Winters v. New York, supra, note 6. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
Annotation in 35 A.L.R. 12 (1925), supplemented in 110 A.L.R. 327 (1937); 11
Mo. L. REv. 197, 299-302 (1946). Note also, for example, Grosejean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), invalidating a tax on the selling of advertising in
newspapers or other publications.
26. Annotations 127 A.L.R. 962 (1940); 141 A.L.R. 538 (1942), supplemented in 146 A.L.R. 109 (1943) and 152 A.L.R. 322 (1944). 11 Mo. L. REv.

197, 311-314 (1946).
27. 62 A.L.R. 404 (1929).
28. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), invalidated an ordinance requiring
a license to hold a public assembly on the public streets. 40 A.L.R. 954 (1926).
29. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 69 Sup. Ct. 463 (1949), upheld
a traffic regulation of the city of New York, which prohibited selling of space
for advertising on the exterior of trucks operated on the city streets. Freedom of
speech was not mentioned. See annotation, "Public regulation of sound truck or
other forms of advertising by vehicles in streets or highways," 121 A.L.R. 977
(1939). Apparently the billboard cases also do not raise questions of free speech
or press. 72 A.L.R. 465 (1931); 156 A.L.R. 581 (1945).
30. See 133 A.L.R. 1402, 1412 (1941), dealing with anti-noise legislation.
Note the suggestions in the opinions of Justices Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson
in the case under discussion, that the soundtruck may be treated as something
in the nature of a nuisance. In Maupin v. City of Louisville, 284 Ky. 195, 144
S.W. 2d 237 (1940), the Kentucky court upheld an ordinance prohibiting the
use of sound trucks within the city limits unless by license of the police department. The question of freedom of speech apparently was not even raised. The
Colorado court also proceeded on something like the nuisance theory in upholding
an ordinance prohibiting the use of sounding instruments to advertise or to attract
crowds, Hamilton v. City of Montrose, 109 Colo. 228, 124 P. 2d 757 (1942).
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Probably analogies or formulae developed in connection with other means of
communication do not furnish a satisfactory basis for determining how much or
what kind of regulation is permissible as applied to such machines as sound
trucks. There are obvious differences, for example, between a sound truck and a
radio broadcasting station, or between a sound truck and a soapbox orator, or
between a sound truck and the distributor of leaflets. As Mr. Justice Reed points
out, a passer-by on the streets may refuse to accept a leaflet and walk on. One
may also quickly put himself out of range of the soap-box orator. Normally he
may turn off his radio. But when it comes to sound trucks, "On the business
streets ...such distractions would be dangerous to traffic at all hours useful for
the dissemination of information, and in the residential thoroughfares the quiet
and tranquility so desirable for city dwellers would likewise be at the mercy
of advocates of particular religious, social or political persuasions."31 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter thought that "Only a disregard of vital differences between
natural speech . .. and the noise of sound trucks would give sound trucks the
constitutional rights accorded to the unaided human voice," and Mr. Justice
Jackson, both in this case and in Saia v. New York, thought that there wasn't
even an issue of free speech.
Though it may be rash to attempt any conclusions from all these diversified opinions, it may be permissible to make a few cautious suggestions. The
ordinance in question was, in effect upheld on the theory that it prohibited
loud and raucous noises. As so interpreted, it would seem to be mild enough, and
an ordinance clearly meaning just that would probably be upheld without too
much question. Mr. Justice Black, for himself and Justices Douglas and Rutledge,
clearly expressed the view that a reasonable restriction of volume, hours of
operation, and place of operation would not violate freedom of speech. On the
other hand, an ordinance clearly amounting to an absolute prohibition would
almost surely be invalidated. It was on this interpretation of the ordinance in
question that the dissenting Justices objected to it. Further, Mr. Justice Reed
also expressed the view that an absolute prohibition would probably be unconstitutional. As already suggested, only Justices Frankfurter and Jackson seemed
prepared to sustain an absolute prohibition. Finally, it is reasonable to suppose
that an ordinance prohibiting the use of amplifiers without a license issued by
some city official would be invalid as a previous restraint.8 2 Both the opinion
31. In Maupin v. City of Louisville, mpra, note 30, the Kentucky court
also emphasized the distractions of travelers and the resulting dangers arising
from such noises. In Hamilton v. City of Montrose, supra, note 30, the Colorado
court pointed out that the evidence showed that the disturbance involved had
lasted an hour or more and was so loud and distracting that business men in the
vicinity were compelled to close all the windows of their establishments in
order to transact their business. Likewise, Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in
Saia v. New York, supra note 18, commented on the distractions and possible
injTry resulting from the operation of amplifiers in public places.
32. Saia v. New York, s-upra, note 18; the licensing provision was apparently all that rendered the ordinance invalid. 127 A.L.R. 962 (1940); 11 Mo.
L. REv. 197, 311, 313 (1946).
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of Mr. Justice Reed and that of Mr. Justice Black recognized this view. Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson would probably approve even a licensing ordinance. 33
Of course, if a licensing ordinance were construed so that a citizen would have a
clear right to a license on application, it would probably be valid, though perhaps
of doubtful utility. 34
OLEN W. BURNErr
DIVORCE-JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE CUSTODY OF
CHILDREN BASED UPON PUBLISHED SERVICE

Beckmann v. Beckman

Plaintiff sued her defendant husband for divorce in the circuit court for the
county of St. Louis, serving him by publication. Defendant, with the two
children of the marriage, was temporarily residing in California. There was no
personal appearance by the defendant at the trial, nor were the children ever
present within Missouri during the proceedings. After deciding that the defendant
and the children were still domiciled in Missouri, the circuit court awarded the
plaintiff a divorce and the two children. Questioning the circuit court's jurisdiction
to award the custody of the two children, the defendant appealed to the court
in the instant case. This court upheld the award.
Since there is no precedent in Missouri for the problem posed, and very
little authority elsewhere, the court interpolated the results ot two similar
Missouri cases. Sanders v. Sanders2 held that where the children and wife were domiciled in Maryland, the wife being served by publication, the Missouri court awarding
the husband a divorce had no jurisdiction to award him the custody of the
children. However, the court interpreted Laumeier v. Laumeier3 to hold that if
both parents are personally before the divorce court, it may determine the custody
of a child domiciled in another jurisdiction. Proceeding on the theory that the
relationship between parent and child is a status, the court found the instant case
to fall within the limits established by the above two cases. Both the defendant
and the children were domiciled within this state, therefore, service by publication
on the defendant brought the res before the circuit court.
33. In Saia v. New York, supra note 18, Mr. Justice Jackson stated that
he did not consider freedom of speech to be in issue. In the present case, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said, Sup. Ct. at 458, "Nor is it for this Court to devise the
terms on which sound trucks should be allowed to operate, if at all."
34. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 133 A.L.R. 1396 (1941).
1. 211 S.W. 2d 536 (Mo. 1948).
2. 223 Mo. App. 834, 14 S.W. 2d 458 (1929).
3. 308 Mo. 201, 271 S.W. 481 (1925). Note that the court there held the
case to be a continuation of the original divorce action wherein all the parties,
including the unborn child, were domiciled in Missouri and personally before the
court; Compare language with State ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall, 257 S.W. 1047 (Mo.
1924) in which defendant wife in the Laumeier case was denied a writ of prohibition.
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There are only two reported cases with facts on all fours with the instant
case, each of which is diametrically opposed to the other, both in result and in
theory. In Minick v. Minick, 4 under a statute similar to the Missouri statute,s
which provides that the court having jurisdiction to award the divorce, has jurisdiction to determine the custody of the children, it was held by the Florida
Supreme Court that the lower court had power to award the custody of the
children. Despite quoting from a case in which the defendant had been personally
served, 6 the Florida court evidently proceeded on the same in rem theory as is used by
the court in the instant case. On the other hand, the California Supreme Court
in the case of De La Montanya v. De La Montanya,7 by a four to three decision
concluded that the relationship between parent and child is a personal one, and,
therefore, may not be acted upon in an in rem proceeding. Further, the court
said that assuming there were such status as alleged, the service by publication
did not bring it before the court, but merely gave the defendant fair notice of
hearing. By way of a much controverted dictum, the majority stated that if the
children were actually present within California, whether domiciled there or not,
the court could award their custody8 The strong and more logical dissent would
reach the same result as the instant case on one of two theories. First, even if
the majority were right in its analysis of the relation, still a domiciliary may
have his personal rights adjudicated while he is outside the state if he is given
substituted service.9 Second, the relationship is not a personal one, but one in
rem which may be brought before the court under the particular facts by
substituted service.
The matter is yet to be decided by the Missouri Supreme Court, and due to
the death of cases directly in point, it might be well to examine cases involving
variant factual situations of the same general problem. It seems clear that
where the children are in the custody of the plaintiff who is domiciled within the
state, the court has jurisdiction in a divorce action to award their custody though
the defendant is served by publication.' 0 In the converse situation, where the
children are in the custody of the defendant who is domiciled outside of the state,
the courts are in agreement with Sanders v. Sanders in denying power to award
4. 151 Fla. 513, 149 So. 483 (1933).
5. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1519 (1939): "When a divorce shall be adjudged,
the court shall make such order touching . . . the care, custody and maintenance of
the children . . ."
6. Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W. Va. 124, 81 S.E. 706 (1914).
7. 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896), noted 16 CA.iF. L. REv. 147 (1928),
apparently overrules In re Newman's Estate, 75 Cal. 213, 16 Pac. 887 (1888),
which is cited in the opinion of the instant case.
8. Criticized in Beale, The Statute of the Child and the Conflict of Laws,
1 U. of Cm. L. REV. 13, 22 (1933).
9. Contra: supra note 1.
10. Kaestuer v. Kaestuer, 228 Mo. App. 1043, 58 S.W. 2d 494 (1933); Hicks v.
Hicks, 193 Ga. 446, 18 S.E. 2d 754 (1942); Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Iowa 238 (1872);
McGuinness v. McGuinness, 72 N.J. Eq. 381, 68 Atl. 768 (1908); Matthews v.
Matthews, 247 N.Y. 32, 159 N.E. 713 (1928).
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the custody of the children. 1 However, were such defendant to enter a personal
appearance, the decisions are not uniform as to whether the court would have
jurisdiction to award the custody of the non-domiciled children. There is some
authority to support the interpretation placed on Laumeier v. Lawmeier by the
instant case that such court would have jurisdiction.' 2 The general rule elsewhere is contra, and is so recognized by the court in the instant case, which
cites numerous cases announcing that only the state of domicile of the children
should decide their custody. Some cases hold that the power is not conferred
by the personal appearance of the non-domiciled parent to determine custody of
non-domiciled children, thus placing the result on the basis of lack of jurisdiction
rather than on policy138 Still another twist is presented where the defendant
and children are domiciled within the state at the time of service of process, but
subsequently leave and are domiciled elsewhere at the time of the decree. In
such case, it has been held that the court retains jurisdiction to award the custody
of the children.24
The above situations amply serve to illustrate the confusion in legal theory
involved herein without going into all of the many nuances of the problem. Nevertheless, some conclusions may be drawn. First, domicile seems to be the most
stressed basis of jurisdiction for awarding custody of the children. Second, a
good deal of the confusion is caused by attempting to label the relationship of
parent and child either as one in rem or as one in personam between the parents. Third, the relationship does not conform to one or the other theory, but
possesses characteristics of both-it has a double aspect. The court in the
instant case took cognizance of this double aspect when it very ably summed up
the decisions as follows: "Jurisdiction to award custody is a function of the
state wherein the children are domiciled, except where both parents are personally
before the court seeking an adjudication, on the theory that their personal rights are
involved. But the courts of this state have jurisdiction to deal with the status of
children domiciled within the state by reason of the interest of the state as
parens patriae. In such case, the res is within the state, and may be subjected to
the jurisdiction of the court in the same manner as the status of marriage. Service
by publication on defendant brought before the court the relation of the children
to their parents."
NED YN R. NELKIN
11. Sup'ra note 2; Oxley v. Oxley, 159 F. 2d 10 (App. D.C. 1946); Long v.
Long, 194 So. 190 (Ala. 1940); Boens v. Bennett, 20 Cal. App. 2d 477, 67 P.
2d 715 (1937); Weber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, 163 N.E. 269 (1928); Callahan
v. Callahan, 296 Ky. 444, 177 S.W. 2d 565 (1944); Thrift v. Thrift, 54 Mont.
463, 171 Pac. 272 (1918); Payton v. Payton, 29 N.M. 618, 225 Pac. 576 (1924);
May v. May, 233 App. Div. 519, 253 N.Y. Supp. 606 (1st Dep't 1931); 19 C.J.
Divorce, § 740.

12.
13.
Person,
14.

Stephens v. Stephens, 53 Idaho 427, 24 P. 2d 52 (1933); supra note 6.
Giachetti v. Giachetti, 157 Fla. 259, 25 So. 2d 658 (1946); see Person v.
172 La. 740, 747, 135 So. 225, 227 (1931).
Roberts v. Roberts, 300 Ky. 454, 189 S.W. 2d 691 (1945).
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Hendricks v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co.1
A policy was issued on the life of the plaintiff's wife on December 17, 1945,
containing a provision that it was to be ineffective if insured was not in sound
health upon the date of issue. The wife died less than a month later of pulmonary
tuberculosis and pneumonia. The records were held by the Kansas City Court of
Appeals to show conclusively that the wife had not been in sound health at the
time of the issuance of the policy and that such ill health was the cause of her
death. In so holding they reversed the trial court.
The holding is one of the most recent to assert the application of the
"material misrepresentation" statute2 to the "issuance or delivery-in-sound-health"
clause found in life insurance policies. The case itself is sound as having at the root
of the decision the materiality aspect as set forth in Missouri Revised Statutes,
1939, Sec. 5843 which is supported by the uncontradicted hospital records, but the

application of the statute relied on to sound-health clauses is not always as satisfactory and invites some discussion.
The purpose of Sec. 5843, like that of similar legislation in a majority of the
states, is to abolish the harshness and unjustness of the doctrine of warranties as
it had grown and was applied in that phase of the law dealing with insurance3
The aim, it has been stated, was to reduce the common law warranty to the
effectiveness of a common law representation.4 If this was the end sought, it must
be said that such legislation has been successful only in part in Missouri. It has
been successful to the extent that the integration of a statement or answer into
fhe policy as a warranty no longer makes such statement conclusively material.
Any issue pertaining to the materiality of a statement finds its answer in the
contribution to the contingency by force of Sec. 5843.5 Thus a sound-health clause
1. 210 S.W. 2d 706 (Mo. App. 1948).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. § 5843 (1939), providing:
"No misrepresentation made in obtaining or securing a policy of insurance on
the life or lives of any person or persons, citizens of this state, shall be deemed
material, or render the. policy void, unless the matter misrepresented shall have
actually contributed to the contingency or event on which the policy is to become
due and payable, and whether it so contributed in any case shall be a question for
the jury."
3. Lynch v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Am., 150 Mo. App. 461, 131 S.W.
145 (1910); Reed v. Travelers Ins. Co., 227 Mo. App. 1155, 60 S.W. 2d 59 (1933);
6 Mo. L. REv.338 (1941) (an excellent review of the entire scope of the statute).
4. VANCE, INSURANCE § 114. (2d ed. 1930).
5. Id. § 110, the authoritative writer states: "The rule heretofore discussed as determining the materiality of concealments applies equally to representations; that is, any statement is material which in any wise induced the insurer
to make a contract which he otherwise would not have made, or would have made
only on different terms .... The Missouri statute goes still further, and, in effect
provides that a representatation shall not be deemed material unless it contributes
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is no grounds for avoidance of an insurance contract unless it be shown by the
insurer that the existing ill health was the proximate cause of the death. 6 That
such a clause is made a part of and incorporated into the policy is no longer a
matter of concern in resolving an issue involving materiality.
But in another respect the fact that a clause pertaining to the good health
of the applicant is or is not inserted into the policy become very important. This
is in regard to the intent with which the applicant made the statement as to his
existing health. If we may assume an absence of the issue of materiality, whether
the applicant knew himself in poor uninsurable health was thus engaged in
practicing a fraud on the insurer or whether he in good faith believed himself in
sound health, although in fact he was not, will make no difference as to his ability
to recover if the statement referring to his sound health is integrated into the
policy.7 But if there be no question as to materiality and such a statement by the
applicant is not made a part of the contract, then all the difference between recovery and failure to recover depends on the insurer showing that the statement
was made by the applicant with fraudulent intent."
The applicant who with good reason actually believes himself in sound
health is subject to a manifest injustice when the insurer is allowed to avoid
its obligation subsequently by a showing that there was in fact an existing illness
which ultimately contributed to the death. 9 By the insertion of a sound-health
clause the applicant makes his actual state of health-not what he believes his
health to be-an operative condition having the same harsh consequences as
formerly arose from the commonly supposed abrogated doctrine of common law
to the loss or damage for which indemnity is claimed." But see Chambers v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 235 Mo. App. 884, 138 S.W. 2d 29 (1940) where the
court in setting forth the Missouri rule for materiality says it is whether the
insurer would have assumed the risk had he known the truth; Yancey v. Central
Mutual Life Ins. Ass'n., 77 S.W. 2d 149 (Mo. App. 1934).
6. There is little if any conflict on this point. Cases in support are collected
in 6 Mo. L. REv. 338 (1941), note 26. The leading case on this point is Kirk
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 765, 81 S.W. 2d 333 (1935).
7. Hicks v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 196 Mo. App. 162, 190 S.W. 661
(1916); Clark v. National Life &Accident Ins. Co., 288 S.W. 944 (Mo. App. 1926);
Hammers v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 292 S.W. 1064 (Mo. App. 1927);
Bohannon v. Ill. Bankers Life Ass'n., 223 Mo. App. 877, 20 S.W. 2d 950 (1929);
Smiley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, 52 S.W. 2d 12
(Mo. App. 1932); Kirk v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 765, 81 S.W2d 333 (1935); Williams v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 91 S.W. 2d 131 (Mo. App.
1936); Fields v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 119 S.W. 2d 463 (Mo. App. 1938);
Lipel v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 192 S.W. 2d 871 (Mo. App. 1946).
8. Houston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Mo. App. 195, 97 S.W. 2d
856 (1936); De Valpine v. New York Life Ins. Co., 105 S.W. 2d 977 (Mo.
App. 1937); Doran v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 116 S.W. 2d 172 (Mo.
App. 1938); Schuetzel v. Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles, 164 S.W. 2d
135 (Mo. App. 1942).
9. No good faith applicant who is insured under a policy containing a soundhealth clause can be certain that his policy will not be defeated after death on the
basis of the holdings cited in note 7 supra.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
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warranty. In this respect it is indeed difficult to reconcile the purpose of the
"material misrepresentation" statute with the existing state of the holdings.10
Another factor which adds to the provocation of the situation is that it is
the insurer's physician who qualifies the applicant as an insurable risk. It is
the insurer then who often stands in the better position to ascertain the true
health of the applicant rather than the applicant himself. This, it is proposed, is
a lengthy stride in answer to an argument that unless the insurer is allowed to
insert a sound-health clause it is denied a certain freedom in selecting its risk."1
One solution suggested to this undesirable state of the law has been the
abolition of sound-health clauses.12 The adoption of such a suggestion would
have at least the merit of giving the bona fide applicant a vested insurance coverage at the time the insurer wrote the policy and took the premium payment,
whatever might be the other consequences.
Perhaps another solution would be possible through judicial recognition of the
rather obvious fact that when an applicant for insurance states himself to be in
good health he must be understood to mean and to intend only that he is in good

health as far as he knows. It will be noticed that this is the effect of Missouri
law where the applicant's statement is not a part of the policy, but to make it
Missouri law where such is a part of the policy would involve overruling a long
13
line of cases.
JOE BEAVERS

LIBEL-PUBLICATION

IN WILL-LIABILITY

OF EXECUTOR OR ESTATE

Carver v. Morrow'
The principal case adds another decision to those few deciding whether
or not an action may be sustained against the estate or the executor of the estate
10. Such an attempt is made in 8 Mo. L. REV. 137, 139 (1943). In Kirk v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 765, 81 SW. 2d 333 (1935) the court reasons
that the premium was fixed on the basis that the insurer agreed to assume liability
only upon condition that the insured should be, not merely believe himself to be,
in sound health at the time of the issue. Compare the reasoning of the federal
court in Security Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Brimmer, 36 F. 2d 176 (C.C.A. 8th 1929)
cert. denied 50 Sup. Ct. 350 (1929) that "We are of the opinion that this statute
(Sec. 5843) does not purport to create any defense to a suit upon an insurance
policy, but that it destroys all defenses based upon misrepresentations concerning
matters which do not contribute to the death of the assured, whether such statements be warranties or representations."
11. 8 Mo. L. REv. 137 (1943).
12. 12 Mo. L. REv. 97 (1947); 8 Wis. L. REV. 377 (1932) (note on the
actual application of such a statute).
13. For a concise but clear presentation of the issue involved in this note and
the practical application of it in Missouri read TRUSTY, CONSTRUCTION AND REVIEWING INsTRucrIONS § 37 (Mo. ed. 1941). The most informative opinions will
be found in De Valpine v. New York Life Ins. Co., 105 S.W. 2d 977 (Mo. App. 1937),
second appeal, 131 S.W. 2d 349 (Mo. App. 1939).
1. 48 S.E. 2d 814 (S.C. 1948).
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of one whose will contains a libel. The South Carolina Supreme Court followed
the reasoning of the Georgia court in Citizens' & Souttern National Bank v.
Hendricks,2 holding that where the alleged libeleous matter in the will was not
published in testator's lifetime, the estate was not liable for the publication made
by probating the will, since the executor was not the testator's agent for the
purpose of consummating the tort but was a creature or agency of the law.
Of the four other cases involving this question two3 in what each thought
was a case of first impression allowed recovery on the theory that the common
law maxim, actio personalis nwritur cum persona,4 did not apply as no cause of
action existed before the testators death, and predicated liability of the estate on
an agency theory. Another case 5 completely ignoring the decisions of the previous
cases denied liability on the theory that the alleged libel was privileged as part of a
judicial proceeding. A New York case 6 allowed recovery on the basis that
probate of the will constituted a publication and the legislature by statute7 had
provided that an action for libel should survive the tortfeasor's death.8
So of the six cases involving this problem in the United States, none allow
recovery against the executor personally, three cases allow recovery against
the testator's estate, and three allow no recovery, but the result in each case is
reached through the application of more than one theory. None of the theories
seems completely sound and the reasoning of the courts in most of the cases
has been severly criticized.
Authorities9 and all the cases seem to agree that libel in a will is unusually
onerous. Since the will is a solemn instrument executed with thought and care the
very nature of the act precludes the possibility that the testator did not mean
to injure the person libelled. Also the will is a permanent record and will be
perused actually by some and constructively by many. The libel will be conspicuous for years to come. For these reasons it would seem that common justice
should give some sort of relief to the person so maliciously defamed. The problem has
been upon what legal basis this can be done.
One of the greatest obstacles to recovery has been the common law maxim
that a personal injury dies with the person, although a few courts have gotten
around this difficulty.1" In Harris v. Nashville Trust Co.,"' the court seemed
to think this old maxim out of date and inapplicable in modem day law. This view
is further strengthened by the passage of statutes in some states providing for the
2.
3.
Co., 128
4.
5.
6.

176 Ga. 692, 168 S.E. 313 (1933).
Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (1901); Harris v. Nashville Trust
Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914).
A personal action dies with the person.
Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 At. 487 (1934).
Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945).

7. N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 118 (1939).

8. Supra, note 4.
9. PaossER oN ToRTs 813-814 (1941).
10. Supra, note 3.
11. 128 Tenn. 537, 162 S.W. 584 (1914), supra, note 3.
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2

survival of personal actions.' However, most statutes are like the Missouri statute,
and allow for recovery in many personal actions after death but specifically except
libel'- and some other actions. In such cases the courts usually say the common law
rule is still in effect as to those personal actions excluded.-- Although many writers
and cases seem to think allowing recovery is directly in conflict with the common
law maxim,' 5 others think it has no application and intimate that the maxim has
outlived its usefulness anyway.' 6 Allowing recovery on the theory that the executor
is the agent of the testator for the purpose of publication has been severely
criticized on several grounds." Death terminates an agency; it does not create
one. There was never an agency either during testator's life or after his death.
The executor is a trustee of the estate, an officer of the probate court and responsible
to it. He holds legal title to property himself and acts for himself as principal.
His duties, rights and obligations are wholly incompatible with the theory of agency.
Another solution to this problem would be to follow the English view and
allow the courts to omit from probate libelous or scandalous passages in the will.8
Several criticisms of this solution can be made however. The libelous matter may
be dispositive in nature and, if stricken, change the intended disposition of the
testator's property. This is in direct conflict wth our policy in regard to wills and
the courts would not have this power. Also, publication to a limited extent is
necessary before a decision can be reached as to what should be deleted. And
there is some doubt whether even non-dispositive matter can be deleted by the
2
probate courts,' 9 although a few American cases have done so.
In conclusion it seems that justice and fair play demand that there be some
protection from the great harm which can result from libel in a will. The best
solution in view of the American cases denying courts the right to strike out or
12.
13.

Supra, note 7.
Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 98-99 (1939); Onio GEN. CODE § 11397 (Page, 1926);
PENN. STAT. § 8555 (West, 1920).
14. Toomey v. Wells, 218 Mo. App. 534, 280 S.W. 441 (1926); More v.
Bennett, 65 Barb. 338 (N.Y. 1873); Bryant v. American Surety Co., 69 Minn. 30,
71 N.W. 826 (1897).
15. See 48 HAxv. L. REV. 1027 (1935). This result is questionable, however,
since at common law a tort action cannot accrue when the wrongdoer is dead.
See 10 N.C.L. REv. 88 (1931); 27 HARv. L. REv. 666 (1914); 12 MicH. L. REv.
489 (1914); 23 YALE L. J. 534 (1914).
16. See 62 U. of PA. L. Rxv. 643 (1914) (Harris v. Nashville Trust Co.);
23 YALE L. J. 534 (1914); 19 A.B.A.J. 301 (1933)
(Gallagher's Estate). See
also POLLOCK, TORTS p. 64 (13th ed. 1929).
17. See 62 U. of PA. L. REv. 643 (1914); 12 MIcH. L. REv. 489 (1914); 23
YALE L. J. 534 (1914).
18. GATLEY, LiBEL AND SLANDER 458, n. 15 (2d ed. 1929); 2 REDFIELD,
TnE LAW OF WILLS 43 (3rd ed. 1866); In the Goods of Honywood [1871J L.R.
2 P. & D. 251, 252.
19. See Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98 (1900); In re Pforr's
Estate, 144 Cal. 121, 77 Pac. 825 (1904); In re Meyer, 72 Misc. 566, 131 N.Y. Supp.

(Surr. Ct 1911).
20. In re Bomar's Will, 44 N.Y. St. Rep. 304, 18 N.Y. Supp. 214 (Surr. Ct.
1892); In re Speiden's Estate, 128 Misc. 899, 221 N.Y. Supp. 223 (Surr. Ct. 1926).
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delete libelous portions of the will and those denying recovery against the estate
would seem to be to let the legislature give the courts authority to expunge from
the will any libelous matter not dispositive and allow recovery against the estate
for libelous matter which is dispositive or which is published before deletion by
the court.
GENE S. MARTIN

NEGLIGENcE-No DUTY

TO LookouT OWED TO PERSONS SITTING
ON PIER OF RAILWAY BRIDGE

Hoops v. Thompsonx
Respondents while sitting on a pier of a bridge on appellants railway were
scalded and burned by the emission of hot water and steam from one of appellant's
engines. There was abundance of testimony that for a number of years many
persons used the bridge to walk from one side of the river to the other. There
was some evidence that at times persons sat upon the piers at the side of the
bridge. The railroad maintained warning signs at each end of the bridge stating
that "trespassing upon the tracks, bridge and right-of-way is positively forbidden," but there was testimony that the sign was not up at the east end of the
bridge on the day respondents were injured. Respondents contended that the
emission of steam at this point was negligence on appellant's part and introduced in evidence a rule of appellant's stating that "blowing of locomotive boilers
not equipped with blow-off cock mufflers is prohibited" at specified places, including bridges. They also contended, although there was no proof that the trainmen
actually saw respondents on the pier, since the engineer testified that he always
did look for persons on the bridge and the only reason he did not see respondents
was because they were not there, that he is held to have seen all that he should
have seen for "to look is to see." Appellant, on the other hand, contended that
although the evidence of user of the bridge by pedestrians was sufficient to cast
upon the trainmen the duty to keep a look-out for persons on the track, there
was no duty to look for persons sitting on the piers as such persons were trespassers.
The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff which was reversed on appeal.
The upper court held that although the evidence was sufficient to require the railway to keep a look-out for pedestrians crossing the bridge, the testimony did not
show such open and continuous user and for such length of time as to apprise the
railroad employees that they should expect persons to be upon the pier. Therefore, respondents were trespassers on the pier and as such no duty was owed them
unless it was proved that engineer actually saw them. Conceding that such
could be done by circumstantial evidence, it was not so done in this case. The contention of respondent's that "to look is to see" was rebutted by respondents own
pictorial evidence and the concomitant circumstances, i.e. that it was night, the
1. 212 S.W. 2d 730 (Mo. 1948).
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position of the pier and lack of proof that the headlight would have illuminated
the spot where respondents were sitting.
The law in Missouri concerning the duty owed by a railroad to trespassers
upon its track is well established. It is that a railroad generally has the exclusive
right to the use of its track 2 and no duty is owed to the trespasser except to refrain
from willfully and wantonly injuring him after he is seen.8 "Succinctly stated,
this doctrine is that a railroad company is not liable for injury to a trespasser
upon its track or grounds, if no duty or care in his favor is omitted, after
becoming aware of his danger, or unless its servant could have avoided injuring
him by the exercise of reasonable care, after discovering his exposed position. It
follows that it will not be enough to charge the railroad company with liability
under this rule that the trespasser inight have been seen by the engineer in time
4
to have avoided injuring him, but it must be made to appear that he was so seen."
There are two accepted bases for imposing liability on a railroad for injuries
to a seen or known trespasser known as the Michigan and Massachusetts rules.
Under the Michigan rule the railroad is liable for negligence after the trespasser
is known, while under the Massachusetts rule it is liable only for willful and
wanton misconduct directed toward the injured party. Missouri, as does a
majority of the jurisdictions, uses the language of the Massachusetts rule but
arrives at the conclusion that any negligence constitutes willful and wanton misconduct. 6
2. Isabel v. Hanibal & St. J. R.R., 60 Mo. 475 (1875); Burde v. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry., 123 Mo. App. 629, 100 S.W. 509 (1907); Ervin v. St. Louis, I. M. &
S. Ry., 158 Mo. App. 1, 139 S.W. 498 (1911).
3. Shaw v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 104 Mo. 648, 16 S.W. 832 (1891); Voorhees
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 325 Mo. 835, 30 S.W. 2d 22, 70 A.L.R. 1106 (1930);
Heiter v. East St. Louis Connecting Ry., 53 Mo. App. 331 (1893); Fox v. City of
Joplin, 297 S.W. 449 (Mo. App. 1927).
4. THoMpsoN, COMMENTARES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 1709 (2d ed.
1901).
5. For an interesting discussion of these rules see Peaslee, Duty to Seen
Trespassers, 27 HAav. L. REv. 403 (1914).
6. James N. Everett v. St. Louis & S. F. R.R., 214 Mo. 54, 85, 112 S.W.
486, 494 (1908) ("...it is wholly immaterial whether they recklessly and wantonly
ran the engine against her or not. That doctrine only applies to cases where the
injured party was a trespasser upon the track at the time of the injury, and at a
place where the agents and servants in charge of the train had no notice or reason
to apprehend that any person would be present at the place where the injury occurred. The mere fact that the petition charges that the injury was willfully and
wantonly caused by the agents and servants in charge of the train will not prevent
a recovery, provided the evidence shows that the injury was the result of their
negligence and carelessness. The charge of willfullness is sustained by proof of negligence.") Accord, Graham v. Pacific R.R., 66 Mo. 536 (1877); Neilon v. Kansas
City, St.J. & C B. Ry., 85 Mo. 599 (1885); Owens v. Kansas City, St.J. & C. B.
Ry., 95 Mo. 169, 180, 8 S.W. 350 (1888); Engelking v. Kansas City, Ft.S. & M.
R.R., 187 Mo. 158, 86 S.W. 89 (1905); Frye v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 200 Mo.
377, 98 S.W. 566 (1906); Lange v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 208 Mo. 458, 106 S.W. 660
(1907); Cole v. Metropolitan St Ry., 121 Mo. App. 605, 612, 97 S.W. 555 (1906).
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Although a majority of jurisdictions holds with Missouri that there is no duty
of lookout owed to trespassers, in a number of jurisdictions it is said that a lookout
is required for any and all kinds of obstructions on the track, including trespassers,
and in the absence of contributory negligence a failure to keep a lookout renders the
railroad liable for a resulting injury.7
An outstanding exception to the usual rule is that where and when persons may
reasonably be expected to be on the railroad premises, the company employees
have a duty of keeping an active lookout for such persons, including trespassers. 8
It will be noted that under circumstances like this the trespasser is considered
as having become a licenseeg because of what might be termed the tacit consent
of the railroad. Eminent authority has pointed out the fallacy of implying a license
in the case of tolerated intruders to whom no semblance of permission has been
given. 10 "Many if not the majority of jurisdictions hold that, if there has been
intrusion sufficiently habitual to make its repetition not merely possible but
probable, upon a definite area by a class sufficiently numerous to make the danger
substantial, the public interest in the preservation of its most valuable asset, the
life and limbs of its members, requires the owner to forego his privilege to consider
only the safety of those to whom he throws open his land and demands that he
shall refrain from doing, without notice, acts outside of his ordinary and normal
use of his land, which create new and concealed dangers thereon. This duty may
be similar or identical in extent to that owed to persons actually permitted to come
on the premises for their own purposes. But it does not arise from the owner's
consent but from the probability of injury so likely and so serious that public policy
requires that it be prevented even at the cost of trenching upon the traditional
privileges of landowners.""
This rule of "waiver" of the right to expect a clear track has been confined
in Missouri to places of limited extent such as are for access to shops, mines,
2
industries and work camps, or outside of cities or concentrations of population.'
7. 52 C.J. 579, § 2141 (b); St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. v. Sharp, 3 Tex. App. Civ.
Cas. (Willson) 394 (1887) (plaintiff injured by emission of steam).
8. REsTATEMENTr, ToRTs §§ 329, 330 and 341 (1934).
9. Easley v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 113 Mo. 236, 20 S.W. 1073 (1892) (If a
railroad company habitually permits the public to use its track passways at
places other than public crossings, such persons become licensees, to whom the
railroad owes a higher degree of care to avoid injury that it owes to a mere
trespasser.) Accord, Stevens v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 151 Mo. App. 300, 131 S.W. 712
(1910); Ervin v. St. Louis, I. M. & St. Ry., 158 Mo. App. 1, 139 S.W. 498 (1911);
Featherstone v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 174 Mo. App. 664, 161 S.W. 284 (1913);
52 C.J. 543, § 2112.
10. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN TORTS 168 (1926).
11. Id. at 179; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 334 (1934) ("A possessor of land who
knows, or from facts within his knowledge should 'know, that trespassers constantly
intrude upon a limited area thereof, is subject to liability for bodily harm there
caused to them by his failure to carry on an activity involving a risk of death
or serious bodily harm with reasonable care for their safety.")
12. English v. Wabash Ry., 341 Mo. 550, 108 S.W. 2d 51 (1937), noted in
3 Mo. L. REv. 423 (1938); Cochran v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 649, 148 S.W. 2d 532
(1941), noted in 7 Mo. L. REV. 320 (1942).
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It is further restricted to the place of user and does not eztend to other portions of
the railroad property. 13 It is generally considered to be a question for the jury
whether the injured party was in a place where the servants of the railroad should
have expected to find him.14 In order to show that the public has impliedly been
given a license by a railroad company to use its track as a passway, it is necessary
to show the public use itself, the knowledge of the company thereof, and its
consent thereto. The latter elements ordinarily cannot be established by direct
proof, but must be inferred, if they exist, from other facts, as, for example, the long
acquiescence of the company in the open, known, free, continuous, and extensive
use of its track by the public as a footway.15 In such case, however, it is only
necessary to bring knowledge of such use home to the railroad company. It may
or may not be notorious.16
If, because of constant user of the railroad property by the public, the railroad
owes a duty of lookout, and there is ample evidence that there was nothing to
obstruct the view of the railroad's servants, such servants are held to have seen that
which they could and should have seen.' 7 In the instant case, however, it was
established that there was no duty to look for respondents on the pier and it was
not evident that the engineer could have seen them at that precise point and
under the circumstances.' 8
JOHN W. INGLISH

13. Crossno v. Terminal Ry. Ass'n of St. Louis, 333 Mo. 733, 62 S.W. 2d 1092
(1933); Shelton v. Metropolitan St. Ry.. 167 Mo. App. 404, 151 S.W. 493 (1912).
14. Hufft v. St. Louis & S.F. R.R., 222 Mo. 286, 121 S.W. 120 (1909); Friemonth v. Kansas City, St. L. & C. R.R., 180 S.W. 1063 (Mo. App. 1915).
15. Rice v. Jefferson City Bridge & Transit Co., 216 S.W. 746 (Mo. 1919).
Contra, McCoy's Adm'r. v. Williamson & P. C. R. R., 174 Ky. 186, 192 S.W. 45
(1917) ". . .it may now be stated as the established rule in this state that members
of the public who use a railroad bridge for their own convenience are trespassers,
and that their status as such cannot be changed to that of licensees by the frequency
of extent of such trespassing."
16. Rice v. Jefferson City Bridge &Transit Co., supra note 15.
17. Eppstein v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 197 Mo. 720, 94 S.W. 967 (1906); Beck
v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 327 Mo. 658, 37 S.W. 2d 917 (1931); Whiteaker v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 28 S.W. 2d 680 (Mo. App. 1930); Nicholson v. St. Louis &
S.F. Ry., 51 S.W. 2d 217 (Mo. App. 1932).
18. In Missouri this duty owed to known trespassers and tolerated intruders
or "bare" licensees is closely linked up with the humanitarian doctrine. However,
under the facts of this case there was no basis for the application of that doctrine
here. See McCleary, The Bases of the HumanitarianDoctrine Reexamined, 5 Mo.
L. REV. 56 (1940); see Woodson, J. dissenting in Murphy v. Wabash R.R., 228
Mo. 56, 128 S.W. 481 (1910), in which he presents some startling statistics showing the appalling number of trespassers killed or injured every year upon railroad
property and especially the great frequency of such casualties in Missouri which he
suggests is -due to what he regards as the undue consideration which Missouri
courts require railroads to show to such trespassers and to the humanitarian doctrine.
"This rule is of recent origin and is a judge made law, pure and simple, and, like
most of them, results in more evil than good. For every meritorious case compensated for by it 50 others are induced thereby to go into places of danger, and are
injured as a result thereof."; or see Bohlen, The Duty of A Landowner Toward
Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right, 69 U. OF PA. L. REV. 237 at p.
252 (1921).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/4

22

et al.: Recent Cases

19491

RECENT CASES
NEGLIGENCE-SOLE CAUSE AS A DEFENSE

Beokan v. St. Louis Public Service Co.'

The driver for the defendant company, a common carrier, stopped the bus
at a space reserved for such stops. The plaintiff, a passenger, in alighting from the
bus stepped into a broken spot in the sidewalk variously estimated to be from
an inch to two and one-half inches deep at its deepest point. She fell and sustained
the injuries for which she brought this action. The evidence showed that the
plaintiff had never previously alighted at this particular stop and that she did not
actually see the broken area until after the fall. It was also shown that the driver
had no knowledge of the defective walk until the time of injury, and the jury at
the trial made no finding that he should be held to have such knowledge. The
plaintiff relied upon the act of the driver in stopping the bus so as to deposit
passengers at the uneven spot in the sidewalk and upon his failure to warn her
of that condition as being such negligence as would permit recovery. Aside from
an admission of the degree of care required of it as a common carrier, the
defendant company entered a general denial and raised no issue as to contributory negligence by the plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant. On appeal to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, the plaintiff contended
that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to submit what is commonly
referred to as a "sole cause" instruction in which it asked that the jury might find
2
the negligence of the plaintiff to be the sole cause of the fall.
BENNICK, C., writing the majority opinion for the St. Louis Court of Appeals
held that it was impossible for the plaintiff to be negligent in stepping from the
bus, as the defendant company contended, unless the defendant company was
also negligent. "In other words, the evidence could not consistently support a
finding that plaintiff was guilty of negligence without at the same time requiring a
finding that the driver had been guilty of concurring negligence. This for the

1. 213 S.W. 2d 253 (Mo. App. 1948).
2. The instruction submitted by the defendant and complained of by the
plaintiff is as follows: "The Court instructs the jury that if you find and believe from
the evidence that plaintiff alighted from the motorbus of the defendant at the time
and place mentioned in the evidence and that she stepped into a hole or crack or
uneven place in the sidewalk, if you so find, and if you find and believe from the
evidence that plaintiff saw or, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have seen
said hole or crack or uneven place in said sidewalk, if you so find, in time to
have avoided stepping thereon, if you so find, and if you further find and believe
from the evidence that the act of plaintiff in so doing was negligence on her part,
if you so find, and if you further find and believe from the evidence that her negligence, if you find that she was negligent, was the sole cause of her fall and whatever
injuries, if any, plaintiff sustained on the occasion in question, and that such
injuries, if any, were not due to any negligence on the part of the operator of the
motorbus in any of the particulars set out in other instructions herein, then, in
that event, plaintiff is not entitled to recover and your verdict must be in favor of
the defendant" That this instruction is in proper form, Johnson v. Dawidoff, 352
Mo. 343, 177 S.W. 2d 467 (1944); Kimbrough v. Chervitz, 353 Mo. 1154, 186
S.W. 2d 461 (1945); Steffen v. Ritter, 214 S.W. 2d 28 (Mo. 1948).
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reason that if plaintiff was to be held guilty of negligence, it was only so because
the driver's negligence had created the dangerous situation with which she was
confronted. It follows, therefore, that the negligence on the plaintiff's part, as
submitted in the instruction, could at most have amounted to no more than
contributory negligence, which defendant had failed to plead as a defense." a
ANDERSON, J., in the dissent recognizes that the situation of the parties was
different, and different inferences could be drawn with respect to the negligence
or lack of negligence of either in failing to discover the alleged defect. He held a
jury might well find under the facts in evidence that the operator of the bus had
a right to assume that a person stepping from the bus to the sidewalk at this place
would, in the exercise of ordinary care, observe the defect and avoid it, and this
would call for a finding that defendant was not negligent.4
The slightest discussion of "sole cause" or a comprehensive understanding of
it in the cases necessitates a clear conception of the distinction between negligence
and causation as used in tort cases. Elementary though it may be, this distinction
has not always been adequately presented in the opinions and has been the source
of no small amount of confusion. 5
Negligence may be said to exist if there is a duty, ie., whether one could
reasonably anticipate or foresee as of the time of the act some risk of injury to
a particular person or one in that class, and a breach of that duty in that the
person charged failed to act as a reasonable man would have acted under the
circumstances. 6 Legal or proximate causation, on the other hand, presents a narrower concept. The outlook there applied is as of a time not only after the
alleged cause but also following the event. Legal cause may be said to be present
when it is possible to view the sequence of events in retrospect and find that this
particular injury may not be considered too unusual or extraordinary as a consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct so as to be considered unreasonable
in making the defendant compensate the plaintiff for the harm.7
It is a basic concept in determining tort liability that an injured person should
not be in a position to require another to pay for his injuries where these were the
consequences entirely of his own act or acts. It is this fundamental concept on
which the defense of "sole cause" is justifiable. Contrary to the firm establishment of
the concept, however, the defense of "sole cause" is relatively new. The first
Missouri case to recognize a "sole cause" instruction based on the defendant's
3. 213 S.W. 2d 253, 257 (Mo. App. 1948).
4. Id. at 258.
5. Green, The Negligence Issue, 37 YALE L. J. 1029 (1928).
6. This is the view of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the leading case of Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), 59 A.L.R. 1253 (1929), and
a view which is most recently affirmed in Panke v. Shannon, 212 S.W. 2d 792 (Mo.
1948).
7.

RESTATEMENT,

TORTS §§ 440-453 (1934); the leading case applying the

"forseeabiity test" to determine causation is Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v. Kellogg,
94 U.S. 469 (1876); cases are collected in note 155 A.L.R. 157 (1945).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/4

24

et al.: Recent Cases

19491

RECENT CASES

evidence was Borgstede v. Walbauer decided in 1935.8 From this case originated
the later affirmed requirement that a defendant must present his "sole cause"
instruction on a hypothesized state of facts as supported by his evidence. 9 This
requirement persists even though a "sole cause" defense may be raised under a
general denial and, as to pleading at least, is not an affirmative defense. The reasoning in support of hypothesization of facts is that a jury will not be as likely to
find what is in fact merely contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
to be his sole negligence, or, without proper reason, impute the negligence of a
third party to the plaintiff as it would be if the instruction were "the mere statement
of an abstract legal proposition." This result occurred because of the recognition
of the availability of sole cause as a defense to the humanitarian doctrine where
contributory negligence must be a foreign issue. The use of the "sole cause"
instruction overcomes some of the advantages granted the plaintiff under the
humanitarian rule by broadening the defendant's defense and not limiting him to a
converse humanitarian instruction.1o The requirement of demanding a complete
hypothesization of the facts as supported by the evidence in the "sole cause"
instruction may well be criticized as being without reason and going beyond the
purpose which justifies any hypothesization.11
The Borgstede case presented a set of facts where the acts of the plaintiff
made it impossible for the defendant by the exercise of the highest degree of care
to avoid injuring the plaintiff, who in turn relied on the humanitarian doctrine.12

8. 337 Mo. 1205, 88 S.W. 2d 373 (1935).
9. McGrath v. Meyers, 341 Mo. 412, 107 S.W. 2d 792 (1937); Reiling v. Russell, 345 Mo. 517, 134 S.W. 2d 33 (1939); Long v. Mild, 347 Mo. 1002, 149 S.W. 2d
853 (1941); Hopkins v. Highland Dairy Farms Co., 348 Mo. 1158, 159 S.W. 2d
254 (1941); Shields v. Keller, 348 Mo. 326, 153 S.W. 2d 60 (1941); Stanich v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 348 Mo. 188, 153 S.W. 2d 54 (1941); Semar v. Kelly,
352 Mo. 157, 176 S.W. 2d 289 (1943); Kimbrough v. Chervitz, 353 Mo. 1154,
186 S.W. 2d 461 (1945).
10. Doherty v. St. Louis Butter Co., 339 Mo. 996, 98 S.W. 2d 742 (1936).
11. Hyde, C, (now Judge) in writing the opinion in Long v. Mild, 347 Mo.
1002, 1014, 149 S.W. 2d 853, 860 (1941) said, "Of course as an abstract legal
proposition, it is correct to say that a plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant if
his injuries resulted from his own sole negligence or the sole negligence of a third
party . . . However, the mere statement of such an abstract legal proposition
does not make a proper jury instruction. As this court said of such an instruction,
'the cryptic way in which this information was conveyed to the jury was calculated,
not to enlighten, but to confuse' Roland v. St. L.-S. F. R. Co., Mo. Sup., 284
S.W. -141, 145." With this compare Dean McCleary's statement appearing in
Sole Cause in Negligence Cases, 10 Mo. L. Rnv. 1, 27 (1945) that "In an effort
to lay down requirements in complicated situations to prevent the jury from
being 'mystified,' it seems that now both the jury and lawyers are 'mystified,'
leaving the appellate court alone in possession of the secret." In Long v. Mild,
supra, it is suggested that the defendant could have submitted a better hypothesization had he stated that his truck was "completely off the highway" rather than
"the truck was off the highway." (italics added).
12. The plaintiff was crossing a street and according to the defendant's
evidence and hypothesized facts submitted in his "sole cause" instruction the
plaintiff walked into the side of his movng automobile. The plaintiff brought
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The suggestion has been made that the instruction submitted there by the
defendant was subject to two constructions. First, the injury would have occurred
regardless of the presence or absence of the defendant's negligence and for this
reason the real issue was one of causation by the plaintiff. Second, since the
defendant had no chance to avoid the injury, a jury could not possibly find him
negligent and therefore the injury necessarily was the result of the plaintiff's own
negligence.18 Subsequent opinions allowing "sole cause" to be pleaded as an
effective defense did not accept one or the other of the views, either of which would
have relieved the defendant of liability, but instead demanded that the instructions
be phrased in the conjunctive so that in order to frame a valid "sole cause"
instruction the defense lawyer now finds it necessary to show not only that
the defendant did not contribute to the cause of the injury, but also that he was
in no way negligent and that the sole negligence was that of the plaintiff or a
14
third person.
The indiscriminate use of "sole cause" to include not only a defense based
on causation but also a defense based on negligence, and the requirement of
hypothesization of the instruction are the two major causes of reversals in the
appellate courts in cases where the opinion turns on the propriety of the instruction submitted by the defense. The result has been a demanding technicality
in drafting the "sole cause" instruction where there is apparently no need for
greater technicality than is required in other instructions embodying a defense
based on the concept that the plaintiff should not recover from another for injury
resulting from hig own act or the acts of a third person. 5
Assuming the issue to be one of negligence on the part of the defendant company in the instant case it appears that the majority opinion requires more than
a carrier's duty to use the highest degree of care, which like ordinary negligencei
must have some limitation based on a reasonable man standard, and instead
makes the defendant bus company virtually an insurer of its passengers. The
dissenting opinion it would seem has a firmer foundation in the recognition that
the presence or absence of negligence must depend primarily on the position or

the action based on the humanitarian doctrine, but by the defendant's evidence
there was no way the defendant could have avoided the accident even had he
seen or had he been held to have seen the plaintiff without endangering the lives
of others.
13. Ball, The Vanished Sole Cause Instruction, 13 Mo. B.J. 50 (1942).
14. See the instruction in the instant case, supra note 2; Fenton v. Hart,
73 S.W. 2d 1034 (Mo. App. 1934); Long v. Mild, 347 Mo. 1002, 149 S.W. 2d
853 (1941); Hopkins v. Highland Dairy Farms Co., 348 Mo. 1158, 159 S.W. 2d
254 (1941); Semar v. Kelly, 352 Mo. 157, 176 S.W. 2d 289 (1943); Steffen v.
Ritter, 214 S.W. 2d 28 (Mo. 1948).
15. For suggested solutions to the existing situation see Dean McCleary,
Sole Cause in Negligence Cases, 10 Mo. L. Rnv. 1, 27 (1945) et seq.; Farley,
Instractions to Juries-TheirRole in the JudicialProcess,42 YALE L. J. 194 (1932)
suggests that the purpose of an instruction is not so much to guide the jurors
in the law as it is to vest control of the case in the appellate court.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol14/iss2/4

26

et al.: Recent Cases

19491

RECENT CASES

situation of the party charged, and this is true regardless of the degree of care
imposed by law.
To the writer the real issue in the principal case is the question of whether
on the facts the negligence of the plaintiff in not looking at the sidewalk when
she stepped from the bus may be an intervening or what is truly a sole cause of
the injury. This could not be considered contributory negligence and an instruction
on contributory negligence given since the defendant did not plead that affirmative
defense. As a matter of substantive tort law, assuming defendant to be negligent,
the chain of causation between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's
injury is broken when an independent act of the plaintiff, not within the reasonable contemplation of the defendant and not the result of the stimulus of the
situation created by the defendant's conduct, intervenes to bring about the
injury."' Under such a state of facts the negligence of the defendant becomes
the remote cause and ceases to be the proximate or legal cause of the injury. The
decision could not rest on this simple declaration of law because under the
existing Missouri requirement it is impossible for the defense attorney to draft
an instruction acceptable to the supreme court setting forth an intervening or
sole cause resulting from an act by the plaintiff unless he also include the broader
and more difficultly proven absence of negligence by the defendant and presence of
"sole negligence" by the plaintiff. Obviously it is the latter question of the
defendant's negligence alone which determines the validity or invalidity of the
alleged sole cause defense in the Missouri cases.

JoE Bn-vEis

ToRTs-LmrrY OF INDIvIDUAL FOR ARREST MADE BY POLICE
Snider v. Wimberly2
When defendant stopped at his electrical service and supply company in
Kansas City, Missouri, at about 11:30 p.m. January 23, 1945, he discovered a
man in his office. The intruder rushed at him, struck him, and escaped by going
down on an elevator and out a basement window. The defendant called the police
and a business associate. The only light in the building at the time of the break-in
was from external sources (street light and a near-by neon sign). The defendant
stated he could not identify the intruder. A Kansas City police sergeant and an
officer of the burglary bureau took charge of the investigation. From the method
of escape, it was deduced that the prowler was familiar with the premises. The
16. AM. JUR., Negligence, § 76 (1941); Beal, The Proximate Consequences
of an Act, 33 HAtav. L. REy. 633, 651 (1920), clearly presents the rule.for intervening cause thus; ". . . where the defendant's active force has come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, the court will follow it no longer, if some new force
later combines with this condition to create harm, the result is remote from defendant's act."
1. 209 S.W. 2d 239 (Mo. 1948).
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defendant imparted to the police the names of several former employees whom he
thought to be of approximately the same height, size and appearance as the prowler.
Plaintiff, a former employee, was among those mentioned. At the request of the police
the highway patrol went to plaintiff's apartment in Excelsior Springs, Missouri
at about 3:00 a.m. on January 24th. There, they questioned the plaintiff, examined his hands and his automobile and then checked with a friend with whom
plaintiff claimed to have been visiting the night of the 23rd. At 9:30 p.m.
the same day, plaintiff was arrested, put through the police "line-up" and kept
in jail about twenty-four hours. Before his release, the plaintiff gave information to the police which led to the arrest and conviction of another former employee of the defendant A typewritten police report which was submitted as
evidence over the objection of the defendant, contained a statement made by the
defendant that he thought the prowler was an ex-employee by the name of the
plaintiff who lived in Excelsior Springs, Missouri. In an action for false imprisonment, judgment was awarded for $10,000 ($5,000 actual and $5,000 punitive).
On appeal to the supreme court this judgment was reversed.
Counsel for the plaintiff seem to have based their cause of action on the actual
jailing of the plaintiff, rather than the arrest, since the action was one in tort for
false imprisonment and not for the tort of false arrest. The distinction between
these two torts is rather a shadowy one, and the text writers and judges have
frequently used the term interchangeably.2 In this decision, however, the court
consistently used the term "false arrest," stressing the manifestations of the defendant leading up to the arrest. Throughout the opinion the court treated the cause
of action as one for false or illegal arrest. There would appear to be a valid basis
for distinguishing these causes of action, on the authority of Missouri cases holding
that in an action for "false imprisonment" there must be a "direct restraint" of
the plaintiff's liberty by the defendant's action,2 while the test announced as giving
rise to a cause of action for false arrest where the arrest is not made by the
defendant or in his presence is whether he ".

.

. directed, advised, countenanced,

4

encouraged or instigated it."The facts in the principal case were tested by this
criteria. Thus it appears that where a person is taken into custody unlawfully due
to action of the defendant, the tort is one of "false arrest," but where the defendant
directly takes part in the incarceration the cause of action should be brought for
"false imprisonment"

2. Gariety v. Fleming, 121 Kan. 42, 245 Pac. 1054 (1926); Coffman v. Shell
Petroleum Corp., 228 Mo. App. 727, 71 S.W. 2d 97 (1934); Richardson v. Empire
Trust Co., 230 Mo. App. 580, 94 S.W. 2d 966 (1936); S. H. Kress & Co. v.
Bradshaw, 186 Okla. 588, 99 P. 2d 508 (1940); Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P. 2d 507 (1939); PRossmt, Tomvs § 12 (1941).

3. Burton v. Drennan, 332 Mo. 512, 58 S.W. 2d 740 (1933); Hurst v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 107 S.W. 2d 183, 186 (Mo. App. 1937); accord, W.T. Grant
Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 141 S.E. 860 (1928).
4. Snider v. Wimberly, supra n. 1; accord, Vimont v. S. S. Kresge Co., 291
S.W. 159 (Mo. App. 1927).
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Without passing on its admissability the court considered the police report as
the strongest evidence against the defendant but found it insufficient at law to
maintain the action of false arrest. Something more than the giving of mere
information is required. The defendant must go beyond such point and instigate
the arrest. 5 However, words alone may be sufficient to show that the defendant
caused or instigated the arrest of the plaintiff,6 and in at least one Missouri case
where a ring had disappeared and a servant girl was suspected, the elements for
false arrest were inferred from the circumstances when the defendant threatened
the girl, called the police, but no evidence was offered that the defendant actually
requested an arrest. In the principal case, the court stressed the fact that the
highway patrol went to plaintiff's apartment and made an investigation before the
arrest was made.
The court in the instant case in drawing a distinction between the torts of
false arrest and false imprisonment, holds that while words alone are sufficient
to amount to "direction, countenance, encouragement or instigation," a bare statement by the defendant that he "thought" the plaintiff to be the guilty party is
insufficient; or if such a statement is sufficient, then the defendant's liability was
terminated by a showing that the arresting authorities did not rely on the statement of the defendant, but acted only after a subsequent investigation8
RIcARD G. POLAND

ToRTs-LIABILiTy OF LESSOR AND LESSEE TO WINDOW WASHER
Roacl v. Herz-Oakes Candy Co.'
This was an action for $10,000 damages for the wrongful death of plaintiff's
former husband, a window washer, who was killed as a result of a fall from the
fourth-story window of a building belonging to defendant trust company. The
defendant candy company was joined as a party defendant on the theory such
defendant was in occupancy and control of the building as the lessee of defendant

trust company. Evidence indicated the agreement of the lease was not signed by
defendant candy company until some time in May, 1942, and the candy company
5. Vimont v. S. S. Kresge Co., supra;Lark v. Bande, 4 Mo. App. 186 (1877).
6. Pandjiris v. Hartman, 196 Mo. 539, 94 S.W. 270 (1906) (ordered officer
to, "Do your duty.") Harris v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 203 Mo. App. 324,
218 S.W. 686 (1920) (defendant's agent shouted to officer, "Stop that woman!");
Oliver v. Kessler, 95 S.W. 2d 1226 (Mo. App. 1936) ("take him on officer, take
him on."); McGill v. Walnut Realty Co., 235 Mo. App. 874, 148 S.W. 2d 131
(1941) (whispered to policeman, "take charge of him."). No distinction between
false arrest and false imprisonment was made in any of the Missouri Appeals cases
cited above.
7. Wright v. Hoover, 211 Mo. App. 185, 241 S.W. 89 (1922) (action for
false arrest and false imprisonment).
8. Cf. Richardson v. Empire Trust Co., supra, (action brought for false
arrest and imprisonment, libel, fraud and slander but recovery denied.).
1. 212 S.W. 2d 758 (Mo. 1948).
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commenced paying the rent January 1, 1942, but nevertheless it may be reasonably
inferred that defendant candy company had prior to November 8, 1941, (date of
deceased's death) entered upon the premises and had arranged with employer of
deceased to wash the windows. The deceased had been engaged in the occupation
of window deaning for twenty years. He was an employee of a company which
specialized in window washing. The cleaning company was to receive $15.00
for cleaning the windows of the building in question, to supply its own cleaning
materials and its own tools and to wash the windows according to its own methods.
Prior to the deceased's death on November 7, 1941, defendant trust company
engaged a contractor to remodel and improve the building on a "cost plus" basis.
This work was in progress on the date of the accident. The court affirmed the
judgment for a directed verdict for both defendants.
First to be considered is the responsibility of the lessor under these circumstances. When land is leased to a tenant the law of property regards the lease
as equivalent to a sale of the premises for the term. Hence, in absence of agreement, the lessor surrenders possession and control, retaining only a reversionary
interest,2 and it is generally recognized that the rule of caveat emptor 3 is
relevant which, in application, indicates that the lessor of premises is not liable
for dangerous conditions or activities of the lessee on such leased premises to either
the tenant or a person on the premises in right of the tenant.4 In general, the rights of
the invitee 5 of the possessor of the premises are co-extensive with those of the tenant
as against the landlord.6
There are exceptional situations in which the lessor's liability continues.
The first such exception is where the lessor conceals or fails to disclose to his
lessee any natural or artificial condition involving unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to a person on the land as a tenant or to those persons in right of the
tenant, and the lessee or such other person does not know of the dangerous con2. PROSSER, TORTS p. 649 (1941):
3. In Shaw v. Butterworth, 327 Mo. 622, 38 S.W. 2d 57 (1931), the court
held that in absence of a covenant or promise, the tenant must take the premises in
the condition in which he finds them, for to a mere contract of letting the rule of
caveat emptor is relevant.
4. Lasky v. Rudman, 337 Mo. 555, 85 S.W. 2d 501 (1935); Pinnell v. Woods,
275 Ky. 290, 121 S.W. 2d 679 (1938) (holding that the lessor is not generally liable
for activities of lessee even where create nuisance); see HARPER, TORTS, pp. 234,
235 (2d ed. 1937).
5. Feldewerth v. Great Eastern Oil Co., 149 S.W. 2d 410 (Mo. App. 1941)
(independent contractor is an invitee). In Connole v. Floyd Plant Food Co.,
96 S.W. 2d 655 (Mo. App. 1936), the court held that an invitee to a place of
business is one who goes there either at the express or implied invitation of the
owner or occupant on business of mutual benefit to both. See, McCleary, The
Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land,
1 Mo. LAw Rnv. 58 (1936), where the classification problem is noted.
6. In Darlington v. Railway Exchange Bldg., 353 Mo. 569, 183 S.W. 2d 101
(1944), it was stated that if such duty was owing to the tenant it was also owing
to the invitee. See Tomlinson v. Marshall, 208 Mo. App. 381, 236 S.W. 680 (1922);
Bender v. Weber, 250 Mo. 551, 157 S.W. 570 (1913).
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dition or the risk involved and the lessor knows or has adequate reason to
suspect7 such condition and risk involved and has reason to believe that the
lessee or such other person by reasonable inspection will not discover the condition
or realize the risk.8 The rule in Missouri is that the landlord will not be liable for
concealed defects or dangerous conditions existing at the time of the demise,
unless he knew of the defects or had knowledge of facts from which he ought to
have known or will be presumed to have known of them.9 For conditions arising
after the lease, the lessor has no duty to inspect and is not an insurer of the
premises,O and is not liable for said conditions unless one of the other exceptions
can be applied.
An exception invoked in numerous cases is where lessor retains control of parts
of the premises such as approaches, halls, stairs, elevators,"1 roofs,1 2 central heating

and lighting.1s The liability arises out of an implied duty to use reasonable care to
keep said premises in a reasonably safe condition and for breach of this duty the
lessor is liable under the normal negligence analysis. 14 Under these circumstances
the lessor has an affirmative obligation. Where several tenants occupy the premises then the landlord retains control of certain parts of the premises, but if
the premises are occupied by only one tenant or under conditions such that one
tenant is in exclusive possession the landlord does not retain control and is not
18
liable.
7. Meade v. Montrose, 173 Mo. App. 722, 160 S.W. 11 (1913) ("...does
not mean that if the landlord has no reason to suspect concealed defects or dangers,
neverthless he must make an examination in an effort to discover them... It only
means that if he had reason to suspect their existence, and did not exercise reasonable diligence to satisfy himself of their nonexistence before leasing, without
mentioning the matter to his tenant, he will be liable.")
8. Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S.W. 2d 844 (1943); Burton v.
Rothschild, 351 Mo. 562, 173 S.W. 2d 681 (1943); 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND
TENANT § 86 (d)(1910).
9. Whiteley v. McLaughlin, 183 Mo. 160, 81 S.W. 1094 (1904); Logsdon v.
Central Development Ass'n, 233 Mo. App. 499, 123 S.W. 2d 631 (1938); Clark v.
Chase Hotel Co., 230 Mo. App. 739, 74 S.W. 2d 498 (1934); Meade v. Montrose,
173 Mo. App. 722, 160 S.W. 11 (1913) (knowledge of facts from which he ought
to have known or will be presumed to have known of them); 36 C.J. p. 220, 221
(1924); RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF ToRTs § 358 (1934).
10. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Huffman, 124 F. 2d 684 (C.C.A. 8th 1942),
affirmed 150 F. 2d 162 (C.C.A. 8th 1945).
11. 25 A.L.R. 1273 (1923) (approaches, halls, stairs, elevators).
12. 43 A.L.R. 1273 (1926) (roofs).
13. Reinagel v. Walnuts Residence Co., 194 S.W. 2d 229 (Mo. 1946) (where
inherently dangerous, landlord required to furnish lights); Darlington v. Railway
Exchange Bldg., 353 Mo. 569, 183 S.W. 2d 101 (1944); 13 A.L.R. 837 (1921)
(heating and lighting).
14. Schneider v. Dubinsky Realty Co., 344 Mo. 654, 127 S.W. 2d 691 (1939);
Gray v. Pearline, 328 Mo. 1192, 43 S.W. 2d 807 (1931); Morelock v. De Graw,
234 Mo. App. 303, 112 S.W. 2d 126 (1937); Buchanan v. Wolff, 105 S.W. 2d 26
(Mo. App. 1937), court held that there is an implied duty of exercising care to
keep them in reasonably safe condition for all persons rightfully using them.
15. Lambert v. Jones, 339 Mo. 677, 98 S.W. 2d 752 (1936); Turner v. Ragan,
229 S.W. 809 (Mo. 1921) (one who rented both apartments in a two-apartment
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A third exception arises where there is a contract to repair and the landlord
does not repair or attempt to repair. In most jurisdictions, including Missouri, a
lessor cannot be held liable in tort for personal injuries received by a tenant
or one rightfully on leased premises as a result of such breach; his liability is limited
to the contract.1 This is to be distinguished from a member of the public who is
injured off the premises while using the street. Here the courts seem to be in
accord that the landlord is liable for tort on the theory of reserved control.17
A fourth exception arises where the landlord undertakes to make repairs. He is
required to exercise ordinary care in making such repairs and is liable for injuries
sustained by reason of his negligence or unskillfulness in making them.18
Liability is also imposed upon the lessor who leases for the purpose of the admission of the public.19 This exception applies to dangerous conditions that the
landlord knows about or should know about at the time of the lease and where he
has reasons to believe that the lessee will not make the condition safe before admitting the public as patrons. This is for the protection of the public and not the
21
tenant, 20 and only applies to those parts thrown open to the public.
The sixth and last general exception is that of the duty owing by the lessor
to those off (outside) the premises. The lessor's responsibility to adjoining landowners and to the public is such that he is not permitted to shift it to another.22
building and sublet portions of an upstairs apartment held in actual possession and
control of halls and stairways so that owner was not liable for injuries occasioned
by lack of repair of stairway); Bender v. Weber, 250 Mo. 551, 157 S.W. 570 (1931)
(if not under landlord's control, then not liable).
16. In Kohnle v. Paxton, 268 Mo. 463, 188 S.W. 155 (1916), it was held
that landlord cannot be held in tort for personal injuries received by tenant as
result of a defect arising solely from a breach of covenant to repair the leased premises, and not from active negligence independent of the contract. Logsdon v.
Central Development Ass'n, 233 Mo. App. 499, 123 S.W. 2d 631 (1938): Davis v.
Cities Service Oil Co., 131 S.W. 2d 865 (Mo. App. 1939); Norris v. Walker, 232
Mo. App. 645, 110 S.W. 2d 404 (1937); McCleary, The Restatement of the Law
of Torts and the Missouri Annotations, 2 Mo. LAw REv. 28 (1937); the authorities
generally are collected in 8 A.L.R. 765 (1920); 68 A.L.R. 1194 (1930); 163 A.L.R.
329 (1946).
17. RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF TORTS §§ 357, 358 (1934); the cases are collected in 89 A.L.R. 480 (1934).
18. Lasky v. Rudman, 337 Mo. 555, 85 S.W. 2d 501 (1935) (assuming to
repair and doing so negligently, landlord is liable for all injuries resulting from
such negligence). See Shaw v. Butterworth, 327 Mo. 622, 38 S..W. 2d 57 (1931)
(stating that landlord repairing or restoring condition of building would be liable,
if negligent, notwithstanding lack of actual knowledge of defect); Vollrath v. Stevens,
199 Mo. App. 5, 202 S.W. 283 (1918).
19. Brown v. Reorganization Inv. Co., 350 Mo 407, 166 S.W. 2d 476 (1942);
HARPER, TORTS p. 235 (1937); RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF TORTS § 359 (1934).
20. 123 A.L.R. 870 (1939) (landlords liability to those entering as a business
patron upon leased premises); 22 A.L.R. 610 (1923) (amusement-injury to
patrons).
21. BOHLEN, STMrIES IN THE LAw OF TORTS pp. 70, 71, 72 (1926); PROSSER,
TORTS § 81 (1941).
22. Mitchell's Adm'r v. Brady, 124 Ky.411, 99 S.W.266 (1907).
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Most of the cases arising under this exception are in connection with private nuisances 23 or dangers to the highway, such as parts of the building likely to fall into
the street 24 or where holes exist in the sidewalk. 25
It was held in the principal case that there was no evidence tending to show
that the lessor through the contractor had negligently repaired the windows, nor was
there evidence showing a defect, but assuming there was such hidden defect there
was no evidence introduced that the lessor had notice or knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the defect. Therefore, the court sustained a directed verdict by the
trial court for defendant lessor.
The duty imposed upon the lessee (occupier) of the premises to an invitee is
greater than that owing to a licensee or trespasser. 2 It may well be stated that
the occupier's liability to an invitee is that to a licensee plus additional protection.
The occupier is required, in the alternative, either to warn of dangerous conditions
and activities, or make the premises safe for the invitee as to those conditions and
activities which the occupier knows about or should know if reasonable vigilance
had been exercised. 27 If the invitee knew about the dangers or they were such that
he could reasonably be expected to know then the occupier is not liable. 28 Since
his presence is for the benefit of the possessor the invitee may assume that the
premises are in reasonable safe condition and he is not required to be on the alert
for possible dangers as the licensee. 29 But the occupier is not an insurer of the
safety of the invitee and his duty is only one of reasonable care.30 Where the in23. Mylander v. Beimschla, 102 Md. 689, 62 Atl. 1038 (1906) (downspout).
24. Foley v. Everett, 142 Ill. App. 250 (1908) (shutter).
25. In Kelly v. Laclede Real Estate and Investment Co., 348 Mo. 407, 155
S.W. 2d 90 (1941), the court held that the tenant as well as the landlord is liable
for any injury which may be caused thereby to a person lawfully in the highway. See
Cool v. Rohrbach, 21 S.W. 2d 919 (Mo. App. 1929); Rose v. Gunn Fruit Co., 201
Mo. App. 262, 211 S.W. 85 (1919) (potentially dangerous hole in sidewalk); 138
A.L.R. 1065 (1942).
26. Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 185 S.W. 2d 820 (1945); Stevenson
v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 348 Mo. 1216, 159. S.W. 2d 260 (1941) (holding
that the owner or occupier of realty has no duty to protect those who go on realty
as volunteers, or with his express or tacit permission, or from motives of curiosity
or private convenience, and a bare licensee, barring wantonness, intentional
wrong or active negligence by owner or occupier takes the premises as he finds
them, but for an invitee the owner or occupier has a duty to take ordinary care!
to prevent injury.

27. Blackwell v. J. J. Newberry Co., 156 S.W. 2d 14 (Mo. App. 1941); Smith

v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 117 S.W. 2d 658 (Mo. App. 1938); Hubenschmidt v.
S. S. Kresge Co., 115 S.W. 2d 211 (Mo. App. 1938) (knew or in exercise of ordinary
care could have known).

28. Perringer v. Lynn Food Co., 148 S.W. 2d 601 (Mo. App. 1941); Horvath

v. Chestnut Street Realty Co., 144 S.W. 2d 165 (Mo. App. 1940); Vairo v. Vairo,

99 S.W. 2d 113 (Mo. App. 1936).
29. Holmes v. Ginter Restaurant Co., 54 F. 2d 876 (C.C.A. 1st 1932); Kroger
Grocery and Baking Co. v. Monroe, 237 Ky. 60, 34 S.W. 2d 929 (1931).
30. Giles v. Moundridge Milling Co., 351 Mo. 568, 173 S.W. 2d 745 (1943)
(an owner is not an insurer of his business invitee's safety); Casciaro v. Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 238 Mo. App. 361, 183 S.W. 2d 833 (1944); Kellogg
v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 236 Mo. App. 699, 160 S.W. 2d 838 (1942).
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vitee goes beyond the area of the business invitation the occupier is only liable
for the new relation as created. 1
In certain cases the duty to warn is not sufficient and the occupier must do
more in the way of safeguarding. These cases generally involve situations in which
the invitee is subjected to unnecessary pitfalls where warning may not be understood
or the invitee may not be in a position to protect himself. 2 Likewise, for common carriers and other public utilities where a person otherwise would have to fore3
This protection
go a privilege to travel or some other corresponding privilege.
where the
patrons
to
injury
causing
includes acts of third person on the premises
risk could reasonably be forseen. This theory appears to be based upon the occupier's control and power of expulsion over the premises. 8
In the principal case it was held that there was no evidence tending to show
a latent defect, or obvious defect, of which the lessee had knowledge, either actual
or constructive, but if it was an obvious defect the plaintiff's decedent must have seen
it and assumed the risk. The directed verdict for defendant lessee was sustained.
JAMES F. FORD

31. Murphy v. Fred Wolferman, Inc., 347 Mo. 634, 148 S.W. 2d 481 (1941);
Philibert v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 342 Mo. 1239, 119 S.W. 2d 797 (1938); Watson
v. St. Joseph Coal Mining Co., 331 Mo. 475, 53 S.W. 2d 895 (1932); 33 A.L.R. 181
(1924); 20 A.L.R. 1147 (1922).
32. McCready v. Southern Pac. Co., 26 F. 2d 569 (C.C.A. 9th 1928); Fleischmann Malting Co. v. Mrkacek, 14 F. 2d 602 (C.C.A. 7th 1926).
33. RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF TORTS § 347 (1934).
34. In Smith v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 160 S.W. 2d 476 (Mo. App.
1942), the court held that the occupant of premises on which another is injured
by third person who does not stand in such relation to owner or occupant as to render respondeat superior doctrine applicable, is not liable to injured person unless
liability can be predicated on theory of public nuisance or dangerous condition
known to owner or occupant, who failed to take reasonable precautions to alleviate
it. See 106 A.L.R. 1003 (1937).
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